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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 11-1753
____________
DAVID PALMER,
Appellant
v.
SAMUEL NASSAN; TERRANCE DONNELLY; SHEILA LADNER

____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 10-cv-00922)
District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 6, 2011
Before: HARDIMAN, BARRY, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 07, 2011)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff David Palmer appeals the District Court‘s judgment following a jury trial
on his claim of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We will affirm.
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I
Because we write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, we
recount only the essential facts and procedural history.
A
As the jury found for Defendants—Samuel Nassan, Terrance Donnelly, and Sheila
Ladner—we recite the facts in the light most favorable to them. See Becker v. ARCO
Chem. Co., 207 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2000).
After a night of drinking, Palmer was pulled over by Nassan, a Pennsylvania State
Police Trooper, in Pittsburgh‘s South Side neighborhood. Pittsburgh Police Officer
Ladner was working with Nassan that night on the Pittsburgh DUI Task Force. Nassan
stopped Palmer because he observed Palmer‘s vehicle swerving erratically. At the time
of the stop, Palmer‘s blood-alcohol content was 0.098 percent.
The officers testified that Palmer appeared to be drunk: he reeked of alcohol,
slurred his speech, had bloodshot eyes, and at times was unresponsive to questioning.
When asked by Nassan to exit the vehicle for a sobriety test, Palmer complied but became
belligerent, and once out of the vehicle moved his hand toward his pocket. Nassan
ordered Palmer to stop reaching for his pocket, at which time Palmer disclosed that he
had a gun. Nassan then tried to subdue Palmer, assisted by Pittsburgh Police Sergeant
Donnelly, who had arrived at the scene following the stop. A struggle ensued. After
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Palmer kicked Ladner, she tased him in the buttocks. Nassan also attempted to tase him,
but his taser misfired. Nassan then handcuffed Palmer, removed the weapon from
Palmer‘s pocket, and brought him to a hospital for treatment of the injuries he sustained
during the arrest.
B
Palmer filed suit against Nassan, Donnelly, Ladner, and two municipal entities on
both state and federal claims, but only the § 1983 excessive force claim against the
individual Defendants reached trial. Before trial, Nassan and Palmer filed motions in
limine seeking, inter alia, a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of evidence of unrelated
incidents in which Nassan had been involved. In particular, Palmer sought to introduce
evidence of an arrest effectuated by Nassan approximately thirty minutes to one hour
before Palmer was pulled over, and of three prior excessive force lawsuits against Nassan.
The District Court excluded evidence of those four incidents pursuant to Rules 403 and
404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found for
Defendants.
II
We review the District Court‘s application of evidentiary rules for an abuse of
discretion. Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 156 (3d Cir. 2002). ―An abuse
of discretion occurs only where the district court‘s decision is ‗arbitrary, fanciful, or
clearly unreasonable‘—in short, where ‗no reasonable person would adopt the district
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court‘s view.‘‖ United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United
States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 214 (3d Cir. 2009)).
―Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.‖ Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
However, evidence of other acts ―may . . . be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.‖ Id. A district court may exclude evidence, even if relevant and
otherwise admissible, ―if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.‖ Fed. R. Evid. 403. Rearranging these requirements, we have said that
―[t]o be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence of uncharged crimes or wrongs must (1)
have a proper evidentiary purpose; (2) be relevant; (3) satisfy Rule 403; and (4) be
accompanied by a limiting instruction (where requested) about the purpose for which the
jury may consider it.‖ Green, 617 F.3d at 249. The first element of this test highlights
that evidence proffered under Rule 404(b) may be asserted for either a proper or improper
purpose. Rule 404(b) ―generally prohibits the introduction of evidence of extrinsic acts
that might adversely reflect on the actor‘s character, unless that evidence bears upon a
relevant issue‖ such as one of those enumerated in the second sentence of the rule.
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988).
Palmer lacks a permissible, relevant use of the purported Rule 404(b) evidence. A
claim of excessive force under § 1983 requires ―the jury . . . to determine whether [the
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officer] used force that was objectively reasonable under the circumstances and facts
confronting him at that time, without regard to his underlying motivation.‖ Mosley v.
Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 95 (3d Cir. 1996). Because the inquiry views the officer‘s actions
objectively, his subjective intent or motivation is irrelevant. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 396–97 (1989); Mosley, 102 F.3d at 94–95. Therefore, while Rule 404(b) might
have permitted Palmer to introduce evidence of other acts to show Nassan‘s intent or
motive, those factors were irrelevant to the proof of the claim and were properly
excluded. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402.
Palmer reaches into Rule 404(b)‘s grab bag for other permissible uses of other-acts
evidence. He contends that the prior incidents show Nassan‘s ―plan,‖ ―preparation,‖ or
―opportunity.‖ To introduce other acts for these purposes, the proponent of the evidence
must show that the prior acts are linked with the acts at issue, but there is no indication of
any such link in the record here. See Becker, 207 F.3d at 195–200 (requiring a common
scheme to assert a ―plan‖). In the same vein, Palmer offers little to assist us in
―pinpoint[ing] the evidential fact‖ he seeks to prove by showing a plan, preparation, or
opportunity. Id. at 195. Palmer‘s argument is simply that if Nassan had used excessive
force on past occasions, he was more likely to have used it here. But that argument
asserts the evidence for ―exactly the purpose that Rule 404(b) declared to be
improper, . . . namely, to establish the defendant[‘s] propensity to commit the charged
act.‖ Id. at 201 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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For similar reasons, Palmer‘s contention that the arrest that took place shortly
before the stop is not an ―other . . . act[]‖ because it was ―part of a continuous course of
conduct by Nassan‖—and therefore that it does not fall within the purview of Rule
404(b)—is unconvincing. Palmer was not present during that arrest. Nor were the arrests
of such a similar character or close enough in time that they could be fairly characterized
as ―intrinsic evidence‖ or ―res gestae‖ by which to judge whether Nassan‘s use of force
was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See Green, 617 F.3d at 239–49
(discussing the history of intrinsic evidence as a carve out from Rule 404(b)).1 Even if
the details of the other arrest were not inadmissible under Rule 404(b), Rule 402 would
render them inadmissible for the reason discussed above. Because the force used by an
officer must be evaluated objectively, Nassan‘s state of mind and other actions leading up
to his encounter with Palmer were not relevant to the question submitted to the jury.
Finally, as the introduction of evidence of other acts had the potential to prejudice
Nassan and confuse the jury, it was not an abuse of the District Court‘s discretion to
exclude the evidence pursuant to Rule 403.2

1

In Green, we held that ―evidence is intrinsic if it directly proves the charged
offense‖ or if the other acts were ―performed contemporaneously with . . . [and]
facilitate[d] the commission of‖ the act alleged. 617 F.3d at 248–49 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
2

In the District Court, Palmer sought the right to proffer evidence of Nassan‘s
other acts to prove only the substance of his claims. On appeal, he argues that the
evidence is also admissible to challenge Nassan‘s credibility, which is relevant because at
trial Palmer and Nassan gave different accounts of the events that transpired during the
6

III
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‘s judgment.

stop and arrest. Even if Palmer properly raised and preserved this issue by asserting the
impeachment value of the evidence, which he apparently did not, he would not have been
able to prove the other acts by extrinsic evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). Moreover, Rule
608(b) gives the District Court discretion to determine whether those acts are ―probative
of truthfulness or untruthfulness,‖ and the District Court would have been well within its
discretion to exclude reference to Nassan‘s other acts both on that basis and on the bases
set forth in Rule 403.
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